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Abstract—Recent  emergence  of  new  vulnerabilities  is  an
epoch- making problem in the complex world of website security.
Most of the websites are failing to keep updating to tackle their
websites from these new vulnerabilities leaving without realizing
the weakness of the websites. As a result, when cyber-criminals
scour  such  vulnerable  old  version  websites,  the  scanner  will
represent a set of vulnerabilities. Once found, these
vulnerabilities  are  then  exploited  to  steal  data,  distribute
malicious content,  or inject  defacement and spam content into
the vulnerable websites. Furthermore, a combination of different
vulnerabilities is able to cause more damages than anticipation.
Therefore, in this paper, we endeavor to find connections among
various  vulnerabilities  such  as  cross-site  scripting,  local  file
inclusion, remote file inclusion, buffer overflow CSRF, etc. To do
so, we develop a Finite State Machine (FSM) attacking model,
which  analyzes  a  set  of  vulnerabilities  towards  the  road  to
finding connections. We demonstrate the efficacy of our model by
applying  it  to  the  set    of vulnerabilities found on two live
websites.
Index  Terms—Cyberspace  security,  Vulnerabilities,  Hacking,
Exploits, Finite state machine (FSM).
I. INTRODUCTION
According to Common Vulnerability Explorers (CVE)  [2],
in  the  last  two  years,  i.e.,  2018  and  2017,  the  number  of
vulnerabilities found on websites are more than 11, 000.
These  massive  number  of  vulnerabilities  leave  a  insidious
attacking surface for malicious hackers. Since vulnerabilities
are the attacking surface for the hackers, more websites are
becoming vulnerable to hacking. Consequently, most website
developers  give  little  efforts  to  maintain  the  security  of
website  updated.  They  are  not  vigilant  enough  to  keep
updating the website security regularly.
Furthermore, most of these vulnerable websites have com-
pelling ubiquitous effect in personal, social, and economic life
as  these  websites  contain  sensitive  information  from credit
card pin number to passwords. If any one of these sensitive
information falls into the hand of malicious hacker results can
be devastating.
Hence, exploration of vulnerabilities of a website has
always been a study of interest to  the  research  community.
There  are  many  scanners  available  such  as  Acunetix  [1],
Arachni  [3], Netspark  [4], etc.,  to  scan  live  websites  for
exposing  vulnerabilities.  Such  vulnerabilities  includes  SQL
Injection,  Cross  Site  Scripting,  Cross-Site  Request  Forgery,
Local  File  Inclusion,  and  Remote  File  Inclusion.  However,
Cross Site Scripting and SQL injection have been the main
focus of interest owing to more malicious effects.
From the attackers point of view, attackers envision to relay
on these vulnerabilities in order to construct malicious attacks
so that he can penetrate the security of live websites. However,
we explore a potential gap here.When we are only considering
an isolated vulnerability one at a time, we may end up doing
not so great harm to the security of the website. However, the
impacts  of  conducting  a  series  of  attacks  combining
diversified  vulnerabilities  exposed  on  websites  is  yet  to  be
explore  in     the  literature.  Therefore,  in  this  paper,  we
endeavor  to  exhibit  that  we  can  achieve  more  malicious
results by combining vulnerabilities which would have been
impossible to do just by considering one isolated vulnerability.
Here, to justify our endeavor, we can draw a real-life analogy
of a chess game. In an international level chess game, a grand
master may combine a series of brilliant moves according to a
genius  game  plan.  When  analysts  look  at  these  series  of
brilliant moves they    say that each isolate move may not do
much harm to the opponent but a series of these moves cause
irreparable damage to the chances of  the opponent winning
the  game.  Similarly,  we  can  combine  vulnerabilities  and
execute a series of attacks combining these vulnerabilities to
cause great harm.
In  this  paper,  we develop  a  Finite  State  Machine  (FSM)
attacking model which will connect and combine the found
vulnerabilities.  Each  vulnerability  is  associated  with  some
preconditions and postconditions.  The attacker can take ad-
vantage  of  any  particular  vulnerability  if  and  only  if  the
precondition statements are true. The successful exploitation
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Now,  the  new  true  conditions  will  enable  the  attacker  to
exploit advantages of other vulnerability, which has these new
conditions as its preconditions.
Our proposed FSM model has a starting state as the place
where the attacker begin to initiate attack. The starting state
has  no precondition statements.  Then,  using various attacks
and vulnerabilities the attacker try to reach the  goal state.
The  goal  states  are  successful  exploitation  of  the  victim
website which is impossible to reach using only one isolated
vulnerability.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• Our proposed FSM attacking model exhibits that  com-
bining  different  vulnerabilities  using  preconditions  and
postconditions  enable  us  to  reach  great  harmful  goal
states  which  are  not  possible  to  reach  using  only  one
isolated vulnerability.
• We  deploy   our   propose   FSM   attacking    model
against  two  different  real-life  live  websites.  One  is
http://testphp.vulnweb.com,  which  is  open  for
penetration  testing.  The  other  one  is
http://teacher.xxx.xx.xx, which is an official government
website.
• Our evaluation reveals that our proposed FSM attacking
model provides a sequence of attacks combining different
exposed vulnerabilities causing devastating effects on the
two compromised websites.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
will  highlight  related  works,  Section  III  will  delineate  the
construction of Finite State Machine (FSM) and our recursive
algorithm to reach accepting/goal states. Section IV will give
comprehensive analysis of the test results that we have found
on two live website  using our FSM model.  Section V will
conclude the paper giving a brief remark on future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Detection  of  various  vulnerabilities  specially  SQL injec-
tion  and  cross  site  scripting  is  popular  in  the  literature  of
cyberspace security. Sonewar et. al. propose an approach for
detection of SQL injection and cross site scripting attack [5].
The  study  in  [6] investigate  on  finding  SQL injection  and
cross site scripting using static analysis tool. Besides, existing
studies such as  [7]–[10] explore cross site scripting and SQL
injection separately in the literature pertinent to penetration of
website.
The holistic approach of considering all vulnerabilities has
inspired other researches such as [11]. However, their research
suffers from one major assumption that we will be able to scan
the  internal  network  of  the  victim  website  which  is  not
practical.  Since  hackers  wont  have  the  required  permission
to go inside the firewall of the victim websites network and
perform scanning.
In this  paper, we have taken a holistic  approach.  Instead
of considering each of the attacks separately, we envision to
look at  the whole picture of available vulnerabilities and to
combine them all for causing greater harm.
III. DESIGN ARCHITECTURE OF ATTACKING 
MODEL
We design  a  Finite  State  Machine  (FSM) to  connect  the
existing  vulnerabilities  on  the  victim  website.  We call  this
stage preprocessing. We choose Finite State Machine (FSM)
since the modeling of the problem is quite complex. Accord-
ing to our thinking, Finite State Machine (FSM) can easily
consume these type of complexities while modeling this kind
of problems.
We model our Finite State  Machine  (FSM)  in  such  a
way so  that  accepting  states  (goal  states)  represent  causing
severe harm to the victim website and starting state represents
the  initiation  stage  before  attacking.  Our  target  is  to  reach
accepting states (goal states) from starting state. To
summarize, we divide our model into two stages as shown
in Fig. 1
• The first stage is for building the Finite State Machine
(FSM). This is a preprocessing stage.
• In the second stage, we run our recursive algorithm to
attain our goal  of directing towards more harm for the
victim website.
Fig. 1. Two stages of our FSM based attacking model
A. Preprocessing Stage: Building FSM
Fig. 2. Three sequential phases of preprocessing stage: building Finite State 
Machine
We develop our Finite State Machine (FSM) in three se-
quential phases as shown in figure 2. This preprocessing stage
will take as input the victim website address and outputs a 
Finite State Machine (FSM).
• Phase 1: Discovering URI tree: In the first phase, we
find every possible accessible resource (URI) to build a
knowledge base for the victim website.  The knowledge base
contains  the  victim  website  information  such  as  Apache
version,  PHP version,  open ports,  the list  of  all  URI of the
victim website, etc.
• Phase 2: Finding vulnerabilities and possible attacks
for each URI: In the second phase, we use the
knowledge  base  of  the  first  phase  to  discover
vulnerabilities and possible attacks on the victim website.
We  give  the  URI  list discovered in the first phase to
available scanners such  as  Acunetix  [1],  Arachni  [3],
Netspark [4],  Nikto [14]   etc. The scanners give us a list
of  possible  vulnerabilities  and  attacks that can be
executed on the URI.
Fig.  3. Four properties of a state: vulnerability name, affected URI, 
precondition, postcondition
• Phase 3: Building FSM by dependencies Analysis:  In
the third phase,  we connect  the  isolated  vulnerabilities
using the preconditions and postconditions.  We can suc-
cessfully  take  advantage  of  a  vulnerability  of  if  all  of
its preconditions are true. Successful exploitation of the
vulnerability will render the postcondition to be true.
We have defined the four properties of our Finite State 
Machine as follows:
• State:  To  differentiate  each  state  of  our  Finite  State
Machine,  we  have  considered  each  state  as  a  unique
combination of a vulnerability and the URI that  which
is affected by the vulnerability. Each state is associated
with some preconditions and postconditions.  We define
preconditions and postconditions as following:
–Preconditions:  The attacks which must be executed
successfully to take advantage of the vulnerability of
the affected URI.
–Preconditions: The attacks which can be executed  on
the victim website leveraging the vulnerability of the
affected URI.
Thus, each state has four properties as illustrated in the 
Fig. 3 and in Table I
• Edges:Edges  in  our  FSM connects  the  states.  The  in-
coming edges to a state represent preconditions and the
outgoing edges from a state represent postconditions.
• Starting state: We use the NULL situation before initiate
attacking as the starting state.  The initial  state requires
no precondition to be true (starting state has no precon-
ditions). We draw outgoing edges from the starting state
TABLE I
THE FOUR PROPERTIES OF A STATE
Vulnerability name
Affected URI
Preconditions
Postconditions
Fig. 4. Simplified state diagram
to those states which do not need any precondition to be 
true.
• Accepting  state:  Accepting  (goal)  states  represent  a
harmful state of the victim website after combining more
than one states.
After the preprocessing step, we build a Finite State Ma-
chine (FSM) for the target victim website. We summarize the
algorithmic details in Algorithm 1.
B. Goal Reaching Stage: Modeled Recursive Algorithm
We  first  mark  all  states  as  not  visited.  Then,  we  mark
starting state as visited and try to visit all other states in using
a  DF S(starting  state)  function call in a recursive fashion.
We  can reach a state if all the preconditions along the path
to  that  state  are  true.  After  the  successful  exploitation,  the
new true postcondition statement will become true. This may
enable us to reach those states which were not possible for us
to reach because of its precondition being false previously.
After  this  recursive  algorithm,  the  visited  marked  goal
states signify the harmful damage we can  do  to  the  security
of  the website. We present the process of goal reaching sate in
Algorithm 2.
A simplified version of our FSM is shown in Fig.  4. The
preconditions and postconditions of  the corresponding FSM
along with the state are shown in Table II.
We  can observe that vulnerability A affects two URI
namely a1 and a2. Vulnerability B and C affect URI b1 and
c1 respectively. So we need 2 + 1 + 1 = 4 states to
identify
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Building FSM: Preprocessing 
Stage
Input: victim website address
Output: A FSM
Initialization :
1: TrueConditionList
2: URITree← 
∅
← 
∅
3: URIVulnerabilityMap
4: for each new resource found in Phase 1 do
5: add the new resource to URITree
6: URIVulnerabilityMap [new resource ]
7: end for
8: for each leafURI in URITree do
9: for each vulnerability found in leafURI do
10: URIVulnerabilityMap [leafURI].add(vulnerability)
11: end for
12: end for
13: for each new true condition found in Phase 1 do
14: TrueConditionList.add(new true  condition)
15: end for
16: F SM
17: for each URI in URITree do
18: for each vulnerability in URIVulnerabilityMap[leaf] do
19: preconditions
20: postconditions
21: for each condition in TrueConditionList do
22: if condition is a prerequisite for vulnerabiltlity
then
23: preconditions preconditions + condition
24: end if
25: if condition is a consequence of vulnerabiltlity
then
26: postconditions postconditions + condition
27: end if
28: end for
29: State = new State(leafURI, vulnerability, precondi- 
tion, postcondition)
30: F SM .add(State)
31: end for
32: end for
initialPostConditions
33: for each condition not prerequisite for any vulnerabiltlity
do
34: initialPostConditions initialPostConditions + condi-
tion
35: end for
36: Start = new State (rootURI, NULL, NULL,)
37: F SM .add(Start)
each vulnerability and URI pair uniquely. The starting state
S0 has  no  precondition.  We  connect  the  starting  state  with
those states which do not need any preconditions to be true
which in this case from Table II    are S1 and S2.
We can conclude from Fig.4  that  to  reach  S3  we  need 
the preconditions conditions x1 and x3 to be true. x1 is the
Algorithm 2  Algorithm for Goal Reaching: Recursive Stage 
Input: The F SM built in the preprocessing stage
Output: A set of goal states reachable from starting stage
Initialization:
1:  all  states Not visited
2:  starting  state visited
3: DF S(starting state)
4: goal set
5:  for each  state  in FSM  do
6:    if state  == Visited then 7:
goal  set. add(state)
8: end if
9: end for
10: return goal set 
DF S(State)
11: Mark all postconditions of state True
12: for each state in FSM do
13: if state == Not visited then
14: if All of its precondition are true then
15: state visited
16: for each condition in post-condition of state do
17: condition True
18: DF S(state)
19: end for
20: end if
21: end if
 22:  end   for                                                                                    
TABLE II
VULNERABILITY PRECONDITIONS AND POSTCONDITIONS
Sate Vulnerability URI Preconditions postconditions
S1 A a1 - x1
x2
S2 A a2 - x3
S3 B b1 x1
x3
z1
S4 C c1 x2 z2
postcondition of S1 and x3 is the postcondition of S2. So to
reach S3 we need to take advantage of vulnerability A on  URI
a1 and a2. If we can make the postcondition of S1 and  S3 true
by  successfully  executing  attacks  on  URI  a1  and  a2   by
leveraging vulnerability A, only then we can reach S3.
We  should  make  a  remark  at  this  point.  The  possible
vulnerabilities and attack list to make postconditions true by
leveraging some vulnerability on a URI are given to us by the
scanners.  Since scanners are not  100%  accurate,  there may
exist false positive attacks. Such as we can see in figure 4 that
in spite of reaching A, we still can not make postcondition x2
true because the possible attacks to make this postcondition
x2 true are false positive attack reported by the scanners. The
dotted red arrow x2 represents false positive attacks in Fig. 4
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We choose two different real-life live websites
http://testphp.vulnweb.com.com (open for penetration testing)
←
←
←
← 
∅
← 
∅
← 
∅
← 
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←
←
←
←
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Fig. 5. Outcomes of executing phase 1 on http://testphp.vulnweb.com in terms
of server information
and  http://teacher.xxx.xx.xx (public  government  website
hence  we are  being  anonymous about  the website  address)
for  testing  our  FSM  attacking  model.  In  both  cases,  our
attacking machine is  Kali linux (2018 July release version).
We download the virtual machine images of Kali linux and run
these image files using Oracle    Virtual    Box.
A. Results on http://testphp.vulnweb.com
Acunetix developed  http://testphp.vulnweb.com for testing
purposes.  It  is  a  vulnerable and  dummy website  authorized
for  penetration  testing  only.  The  website  is  fairly  simple
functionality wise. It contains a list of dummy artists’ name
and there are some dummy artworks with the artist’s name.
After logging in the user can buy and add these artworks to
his cart.
In  order  to  compromise  the  security  of  the  website
http://testphp.vulnweb.com our  FSM  attacking  model
leverages the vulnerabilities found on the website and relates
these vulnerabilities in two stages as shown in figure 1.
We will  first  discuss  the  three  sequential  phases  of  the
preprocessing stage to build the FSM.
Outcomes  of  phase-1:  In  this  phase,  we  gain  as  much
information as  we can about  the website.  We are  able  to
crawl the entire website resources in this case. For crawling
and fetching HTML, PHP and XML  data  of  the  website,
we utilize the Python framework BeautifulSoup [12].  We use
Nmap  [15]  for  scanning  open  ports.  Figure[5]  shows  the
server  information and  figure[6]  shows the resource tree of
our target victim website http://testphp.vulnweb.com.
Fig. 6. Outcomes of phase-1 on  http://testphp.vulnweb.com in terms of URI
resources. The leaf nodes represents resources. The non-leaf nodes represents
directory/folder
Outcomes of phase-2: Outcomes of phase-2: After having,
the knowledge base of the website at our disposal, we then
find the vulnerabilities of each URI as shown in  figure[6] in
the second phase.
We give resources of the website as an input to scanners.
The  scanners  find  their  vulnerabilities  along  with  the
necessary preconditions and postconditions. The results are of
the scan  is summarized in figure III.
Outcomes of phase-3: This phase is the most crucial part
of our model. In this phase, we build the Finite State Machine
(FSM).  We build the FSM by defining the four properties of
an FSM:
• Sates: As shown in Table IV we denoted  10 states each
being a unique combination a vulnerability and a URI.
• Edges: We have associated each state with some precon-
dition  and  post-condition.  The  preconditions  and  post-
conditions are shown in  Table  III are used to connect
the  10 states. The number of incoming edges to a state
and outgoing edges from  a  state  is  respectively equal
to  the  number  of  preconditions  and  postconditions  the
corresponding  state  has.  Such  as,  in  Fig.7, S6  has  3
preconditions and  1  postcondition. Hence, we associate
3 incoming edges and 1 outgoing edge with S6.
• Starting state: S0 represents the starting state where we
begin to  initiate  series  of  attacks.  We connect S0 with
those states which have no preconditions. Such as Fig. 7
shows that S0 is connected to S1, S2, S3, S5, S9 as these
states have no preconditions in them.
• Accepting state:  The  RED colored  states  represents  a
goal/accepting state of the FSM. Such as Fig.  7 shows
S4,  S7,  S10 are  the  goal  states  here.  S4,  S7,  S10 are
the  goal  states  not  reachable  from  S0,  if  we  had  not
considered other states and connected these states using
preconditions and postconditions.
Fig.     7. The  simplified  Finite  State  Machine  (FSM)  for
http://testphp.vulnweb.com The states are connected using the preconditions
and postconditions from Table IV
For the demonstrative purpose, we are going to delineate
how we can reach S4 from S0.
TABLE III
OUTCOMES OF PHASE-3 ON HTTP  ://  TESTPHP  . VULNWEB  . COM IN TERMS OF BUILDING A FSM
State Vulnerability URI Precondition Postcondition
S1 Weak password /login.php None Narrow search space of password.
S2 Email addresses discloser /index.php None Email of a registered is found.
S3 HTTP basic authentica-
tion
/auth.php None Not blocking multiple failed log-in attempts.
Not blocking the same GET request again and 
again.
S4 Brute force dictionary
attacks possible
/auth.php Narrow search space of  password.
Email address of a registered  user
Not blocking multiple failed login attempts
Successfully logging in as registered
user.
S5 iFrame header is missing /login.php None Embedding the logging form into a third party
web-page.
S6 Social engineering
attacks
/login.php Embedding the logging form into a third party web-page
User clicking the address of third party web-page sent in 
email
Defining emails of registered users
User redirected to a third party web-page
S7 Cross-site Request
Forgery in Login Form
/login.php Redirection to a third party web-page
User filling up the logging form
Reading the user name password
entered by the user from the third party
S8 Session-cookie without
HttpOnly
ALL URI Redirection to a third party web-page
Session cookie already save in client browser for the 
logged in user
Stealing session cookie PHPSESSID
of logged in user from thrid part web-page
S9 Slow response time /Flash/add.fla None Running time and memory expensive process
for the server
S10 DDoS /Flash/add.fla Running time and memory expensive process for server
Not blocking any request to load the same resource again 
and again
END
From  S4  to  S0: To  reach S4 from So, as we can from Fig.
7 we need 3 preconditions to be true. From Table III  we can
see that these three conditions are.
• Weak  Password:  The scanner  reports  that  password
set  by the  registered  users  have weak passwords.  This
is a good news  for  us  since  it  increases  our  chances
of cracking the password by trying all passwords from
dictionary password lists. The outgoing edges of S1 make
this precondition true for S4.
• Email address discloser: The scanner found a registered
users email address from  17  pages in total. This email
address is useful since now we don’t need the usernames
of the registered users. This website allows the registered
users to log into the website using emails.
• Not  blocking  multiple  login  attempts:  This  website
uses HTTP basic authentication which is vulnerable since
it does not block users for multiple failed login attempts.
Our brute force Python script tries logging in one attempt
per second. Still, the server did not block us, after multi-
ple failed login attempts because one of the postcondition
of S3 is not to block.
Since all these preconditions are true, now we can conclude
that the victim website is vulnerable to brute force dictionary
attacks affecting /auth.php URI meaning we can reach state
S4.
In the same  way, we can say the same things about other
states. Fig. 7 is drawn using the Table III. Interesting to note as
shown in Fig. 7, S6, S7, and S8 have a dotted incoming edge.
These edges mean that the value of these preconditions
to be true, we have to rely on victim user fault or carelessness.
Such as the dotted incoming edge to S6 represents if the user
has clicked the malicious link we have sent to him. If the user
clicks,  then  this  precondition  becomes  true.  A careful  user
would not click the link in the email making this precondition
false.
B. Results on http://teacher.xxx.xx.xx
The  reason  for  choosing  http://teacher.xxx.xx.xx to   test
our FSM attacking  model  is  that  it  is  an  outdated  website.
However,  being  a  government  website,  it  is  used  for  such
important official work. Executing active attacks against this
official  website requires higher order permission which was
not  possible  for  us  to  get  before  the  paper  submission
deadline. Hence we have only executed passive attacks.
Therefore we have used our Finite State Machine (FSM)
attacking model in passive mode only. We only executed those
attacks which would not cause any direct harm to the website.
In the preprocessing stage, we build an FSM in three
sequential  steps  as  shown in figure  2.  In  the goal reaching
stage, we reach those states which were not possible to reach
considering only isolated states.  We are going to describe the
outcomes of the three stages of prepossessing, then present the
goal reaching stage.
Outcomes  of  phase-1:  For  gaining  as  much information
and resources as we can about the website. we crawl the entire
victim website. For crawling and fetching the resources of the
website, we utilize Python framework BeautifulSoup [12]. We
use Nmap [15] for scanning open ports. Fig. 8 shows server
information and Fig.  9  shows the resource tree of the victim
live website http://teacher.xxx.xx.xx.
Fig.  8.  Outcomes  of  phase-1  on  http://teacher.xxx.xx.xx in  terms  of  server
information.
Fig.  9.  Outcomes  of  phase-1  on  http://teacher.xxx.xx.xx in  terms  of  URI
resources. The leaf nodes represents resources. The non leaf nodes represents
directory/folder
Outcomes of phase-2: After gaining the knowledge base of
the website, we then find the existing vulnerabilities for URI
resources on the outdated live website http://teacher.xxx.xx.xx
in this second phase.
In this phase, we utilize Acunetix  [1],  Netspark  [4],  Nikto
[14], and  Dirbuster  [13]. We  use  four  scanners  for double
checking of the existing vulnerabilities. Found vulnerabilities
after double checking are summarized in Table IV.
Outcomes of phase-3:  This the phase where we connect
vulnerabilities and build the FSM. As we can observe from
Table IV, We denote 7 states. Each state is a unique combina-
tion of a vulnerability and URI resource. The build FSM from
the resulted table IV    of phase-3 is shown in Fig 9.
Now the preprocessing is complete and we have an FSM
on our hand, we are going to explain how can we reach goal
state S7 using our recursive algorithm as shown in Algorithm
1.
From  Start  to  S3:  S3  represents  the  state  of  /phpMyAd-
min/index.php page being vulnerable to insufficient sanitation
of user-supplied input. We can see it has two incoming edges
representing two preconditions namely MySQL being the user
database and PHP version  2.x.x.  Both of the preconditions
are  true.  Post-condition  of  S1  ensures  MySQL is  the  user
database. Postcondition of S2 reveals that PHP version is
2.0.49 (2.0.49 ≤ 2.x.x). Hence we can reach S3 from Start
Fig. 10. Outcomes of phase-3: build FSM on http://teacher.xxx.xx.xx
since S1 and S2 has no preconditions.
From S3 to S5: When we reach S3, we mark its
postconditions as true. Marking the only post-condition of S3
means we can use the set variable such as what  equal to the
file we want   to see. However to view the file we need to log
in  as  a  user.  We  can  only  see  those  files  which  have  read
permission for  the logged in user. To log in as non-privilege
user we can advantage of the post-condition of S4.  We can
mark S4 as visited since we have already visited S1 before
while exploring S3. As a proof of concept, we are attaching
the screen shot of the contents of  /etc/passwd file which is
the post-condition of S5.
From S5  to  S7: S7 represents a state where we can log in as
a registered user. We can visit S7 is the two preconditions are
true. Looking at the precondition of S7 we see one of them
getting usernames of registered users which is true since we
can visit S5. Also,  We  can execute a python script to brute
the password since the HTTP basic authentication is used and
it doesn’t prevent us from trying to log in to an account with
the same, again and again, meaning a successful brute force
dictionary attack. Now, this brute force is an active attack and
if we want to execute a brute force attack we need permission
which we do not have. Hence we could not simulate in real
life if we can actually reach S7.
We are presenting the proof of concept of the two precon- 
ditions of S7.
• The  first  precondition  possible  brute  force  attack  is  a
postcondition  of  the  S5  stage  which  is  possible  brute
force attack. Since HTTP basic authentication is used we
suspect  a  possible  attacking  surface  for  brute  force
attack. Indeed when we are run our brute force Python
script is was true as shown in Fig. 11. We execute a brute
force  attack  against  http://teacher.xxx.xx.xx in  less
aggressive mode since we were not allowed to harm the
website in any way. We only need the proof of concept of
a possible brute force attack.
≤
TABLE IV
OUTCOMES OF PHASE-3 ON HTTP  ://  TEACHER  . XXX  . XX  . XX IN TERMS OF BUILDING A FSM
State Vulnerability name URI Precondition Post-condition
S1 PHPinfo() page found /test.php None Administrative URI of DB is /php-
MyAdmin/index.php
Deafult user account and password has 
no value
S2 Out-of-date Version
(Apache)
NULL None PHP version 2.0.49
S3 Insufficient sanitation
of user-supplied input
/phpMyAdmin/index.php/ MySQL must be used as DB
PHP version ≤ 2.x.x
revealing the contents of directories .
to remote attackers
S4 Unauthorized logging /phpMyAdmin/index.php Deafult user account and password has
no value
Successful logging in as non privi-
leged user.
S5 Local file inclusion /phpMyAdmin/export.php?what=../../../../..
/../../../../../../../etc/passwd%00
revealing the contents of directories to
remote attackers
Successful login as non privileged user
Getting user names of registered users
by accessing file /etc/passwd/
which have permission 777.
S6 HTTP basic authenti-
cation
login/auth.php Possible brute force attack
S7 Unauthorized logging /login/auth.php Getting usernames of registered users
HTTP basic authentication
Successfully log in as registered users.
Fig. 11. Proof of concept: possible brute force attack (in less aggressive 
mode) on http://teacher.xxx.xx.xx
• The other precondition is to get  the usernames of reg-
istered users. Fig.12 show the contents of /etc/passwd
which  is  a  post-condition  of  the  state  S5.  The picture
is blurred since it contains sensitive information such as
registered usernames and their home directory location.
V. FUTURE WORK
In  the  future,  we  have  ambitions  to  automate  the  entire
process of connecting the vulnerabilities and finding out ways
to  cause  more  harms to victim websites.  Consequently, we
want to make our FSM model dynamic so that it can adapt
itself with the introduction of new types of vulnerabilities
Fig. 12. Proof of concept: getting user names of registered user by accessing
file  /etc/passwd on http://teacher.xxx.xx.xx .The picture is blurred since it
contains sensitive information such as registered usernames and their home
directory location.
leveraging techniques of deep learning. Moreover, we will add
new metrics  such  as  time,  amount  of  sensitive  information
obtained, etc., to measure how much damage our FSM model
can do to a website.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we endeavor to find the holistic approach to
connect all possible vulnerabilities in order to cause more
harm to the security of the websites in comparison to harm
caused by one or two vulnerability. Therefore, in this paper,
we  propose  an FSM attacking model combine different
vulnerabilities
together. Deployment of our FSM attacking model on two live
websites illustrates the effectiveness of our proposed model by
discovering more harmful states. Consequently, our proposed
FSM attacking model acts as a security assessment tool for any
websites. Moreover, our FSM attacking model is one of the steps
towards  the  direction  of  automating  the  website  security
assessment tools.
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